



The impact of inflation on interest rates The brutal ending of the "low for longer" narrative

Etienne de Callataÿ Orcadia AM Credit Broker Association LLN, the 28th of September 2022

Introduction

• Major concerns

(war, purchasing power, environment)

• Negative returns

... including on defensive portfolios

Stagflation widely expected

 \Rightarrow What will happen with interest rates ?





Content





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1. Environment

(1) Pandemics – getting used to it

- Still with us
- Especially in China
- With impact on
 - * supply
 - * sentiment
- But most likely on the way of receding





(2) Russia – nobody knows

- No economic rationale => impossible to predict
- Bad news
 - * More uncertainty for longer
 - * Risk of face-saving behavior
 - * Inflation scares
- Other geopolitical tensions







(3) Environment – no place to hide

A common good concern first

... with economic costs now directly perceivable

- Public health costs and expenditure
- Impact on crop yield
- Impact on industrial production
 - Physical constraints (river Rhine)
 - Necessity to curb future emissions
- Impact on labor productivity





(4) Inflation – a long-lasting transitory phenomenon

Belgium

Inflation sous-jacente et inflation hors énergie







(5) Interest rates – Bye bye, "lower for longer"

10 year interest rates, US vs Germany – « pas de deux »





(6) Social cohesion

Remember ...



• It is worth remembering that the chant going into Tahrir Square in the Arab Spring was "Bread, Freedom, Dignity."

(Jeremy Grantham, GMO, April 2022)

• Public-opinion polls have shown that inflation (or something like inflation) has often been viewed as the most important national problem.

(Robert Shiller (1997), quoted by Agarwal & Kimball, How Costly Is Inflation ?, IMF, March 20)



Run to shelter !

« The perfect storm »

- Public health
- Geopolitics
- Environment
- Inflation
- Financial conditions
- Social cohesion





BUT (a) we love horror shows





BUT (b) bad news are sometimes neither bad nor new

- Bad news that are not new
 - Russia (cf. Crimea)
 - China/Taiwan
 - Environmental concerns (Club of Rome 50 years ago !)
- Bad news no longer that bad
 - Covid
 - Worldwide food crisis due to missing grains from Ukraine
- Good news
 - Weakness of Russia
 - Democracies are not that inefficient (zero Covid policy in China ...)
 - European integration (anti-fragmentation program)
 - Inflation Reduction Act in the US





BUT (c) crisis are the normality

Crisis ? What crisis ?

- 2008 2009 Great Financial crisis
- 2010 2012 + EU Sovereign debt crisis
- 2015 2016 Migration crisis
- 2020 2021
- Migration crisis Sanitary crisis

Main lessons :

- "so far so good"
- Procrastination to kick the can down the road











12 months ago

Capex

- Technology
- Climate transition
- ESG
- Low interest rates

Consumption

- Sustained income
- High savings
- No fear of unemployment

Budgetary policy

• Low interest rates

- Monetary policy
- friendly



12 months later

Capex

- Technology
- Climate transition
- ESG
- Low interest rates

Consumption

- Sustained income ... BUT INFLATION
- High savings
- No fear of unemployment ... BUT WAR

Budgetary policy

Low interest rates
... BUT RISING

Monetary policyFriendly ... BUT LESS SO



Sharp slowdown





Sharp slowdown ... but no deep recession

GROWTH PROJECTIONS







Ban on Russian gas : costly ... but bearable

Comment l'arrêt des flux de gaz russe pourrait affecter l'Europe

Perte de PIB en % douze mois après un arrêt théorique des livraisons de gaz russe, par pays européen

Scénario optimiste * Scénario pessimiste **

U SK



Source : Statista, 26 juillet 2022 Voir pour étude détaillée sur l'Allemagne, voir : Ntribute PB 028 2022.pdf

* faibles frictions d'ajustement, marché intégré, contribution du GNL.

** fortes frictions d'ajustement, marché fragmenté, ménages protégés.

Source : FMI





Plenty of imminent threats

- War escalation
- Energy & power shortages
- Inflation => ∖ purchasing power
- Uncertainty => ∖ capital expenditure
- Monetary tightening
- Tension within the Euro Area
- Nationalism
- Negative wealth effect



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... but so far corporations do hire and do invest

United States



Source: Federal Reserve of Saint-Louis https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LMJVTTUVUSM647S#



Source: Federal Reserve of Saint-Louis

https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A006RE1Q156NBEA#



Bis repetita placent – Yesterday's supports are still largely at play

- Savings ratio
- Labor market
- Technology
- Environmental transition
- Lenient fiscal policy
- Low real interest rates





Sharp slowdown but NO deep recession

- Past support arguments (see previous slide)
- No negative surprise effect (cf. Jim O'Neill)
- Labor hoarding
- China will have to reignite growth



⇒ My preferred "triple P" rule that a recession is a persistent (lasting in time), profound (in magnitude) and pervasive (across regions and sectors) contraction in economic activity is not currently satisfied. (Greg Daco, 25 July 2022)



"Stagflation is back" ? Yes and mostly no

Mind the difference

- Lower growth + higher inflation
- Back to the 70s?
 - * inflation then
 - * inflation anchoring then
 - * growth then
 - * unemployment then
 - * oil/GDP then
 - * wage indexation then
 - * trade unionization then

YES NO much higher absent much lower much higher and rising much higher much more frequent much stronger



More fossil-free

The world gets much more mileage per barrel of oil than in the 1970s, helping to insulate the global economy from price shocks.



Source: St. Louis Fed; BLS; and IMF staff calculations. Note: Oil intensity is defined as barrels of oil needed to produce \$1 million in real GDP. Real GDP is based on constant 2017 purchasing-power-parity international dollars. Right panel – spot crude oil price: West Texas Intermediate (WTI)/consumer price Index for all urban consumers: all items in U.S. city average.

Source : Nico Valckx, Lower Oil Reliance Insulates World From 1970s-Style Crude Shock, IMF Blog, May 2022







3. Inflation

From one fear to another

Where is the deflation story gone ? Do you remember ? Not so long ago what was the macro risk #1 ? The "japanization", meaning a perma deflation world !







Commodity prices – "Houston, we have a problem"



2003 – 2022, All Commodity Price Index, 2016 = 100

; All Commodity Price Index, 2016 = 100, includes both Fuel and Non-Fuel Price Indices

Source : IMF, IMF Data, Primary Commodity Price System

https://data.imf.org/?sk=471DDDF8-D8A7-499A-81BA-5B332C01F8B9&sId=1547558078595



Commodity prices – the end of a trend ?

200 WWI **Oil Shock China Shock** WWII 100 50 **Great Depression** 1900-2002: -1% annual trendline 25 1900 1930 1910 1920 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

As of 3/31/2022 | Source: Global Financial Data, GMO

EXHIBIT 2: GMO COMMODITY INDEX



Commodity prices – why a reversal ?

- The environmental transition
 - New needs (transport, heating, ...)
 - Regulation

...

- Polluter pays tax principle
- Fear of stranded assets => lowering of supply
- Lower yields (impact of climate and of less polluting inputs on yields)
- Social concerns (labor conditions)
- Growing demand from emerging countries



Source: Wood Mackenzie

Source : The Economist, March 28, 2022



Inflation at large – why a reversal ?

- Russia
- Covid
- Exchange rate depreciation of the euro AND ALSO
- Emerging markets no longer emerging / higher wages
- Re-shoring / friendly shoring / end of globalization
- Demographics + "Great resignation" = Labor shortage
- Mismatch supply vs. demand
 - on the labor market
 - on the goods and services market
- + Excessive money supply ???





A reversal ? Mind your mind !

Be careful!

- *"This time is different"*? Unlikely, as times are rarely that different !!!
- Higher prices =>
- Higher supply



- + Demand substitution
- + Innovation
- => self-correcting process





Back to « business as usual » ?

Arguments :

- Self-correcting mechanism : with ↗ price, ↗ supply AND ↘ demand
- Declining prices (oil, other commodities, freight, ...)
- Bottlenecks are vanishing
- No wage-price spiral, at least at this stage (see graph)
- Competition from low wage countries far from being over
- Technology
 - Teleworking => increased competition between workers
 - Increased productivity
- Room for lower corporate margins (revival of competition rules ?)
- Commitment of central banks
- Credibility of central banks still intact (see next slide)

Figure 5

Recent wage growth is consistent with core PCE inflation growth of about 4 percent



Source : Jason Furman (PIIE) and Wilson Powell III (Harvard Kennedy School), A tight US labor market stays tight, PIIE, September 2, 2022

Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics via Macrobond and authors' calculations



Central banks : poor record, strong credibility

• Mistakes : inflation, not announced, then seen as temporary

Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell admits 'we now understand better how little we understand about inflation'

BUT

- Real rates still close to zero, or below 0%
- Limited spread widening
- Markets do follow central banks' guidance
- \Rightarrow Don't fight the Fed, more than never !











United States

Markets do not expect a new inflation regime



Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland calculations based on data from Blue Chip, Bloomberg, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Federal Reserve Board, Haver Analytics, and the model of Haubrich, Pennacchi, and Ritchken, 2012. "Inflation Expectations, Real Rates, and Risk Premia: Evidence from Inflation Swaps." Review of Financial Studies, 25(5).



Nevertheless, it's wise to protect portfolios against some structurally higher inflation

Arguments :

- Environment
 - Higher taxes, more cumbersome regulation
 - Switch in demand patterns, with asymmetric price effect
 - Lower crop yield, lower labor productivity
 - Higher insurance premia
- Increasing production costs
 - Demographics (see Goodhart & Pradhan, 2020)
 - De-globalization (nationalism, risk diversification, border tax adjustment, ...)
 - End of wage compression
- Economic policy
 - Some higher inflation is desirable ! (see next slide)

Référence détaillée : C.A.E. Goodhart1 and Manoj Pradhan, The Great Demographic Reversal: Ageing Societies, Waning Inequality, and an Inflation Revival, SUERF, SUERF Policy Note, Issue No 197, October 2020






Inflation

Inflation, my friend ... "Economists against the people" ?

- Cons
 - Losers and winners, with adverse social impact
 - Uncertainty => less activity / higher risk premium
- Pros
 - Good for indebted authorities ... and therefore for macroeconomic & financial stability
 - Penalty on cautious savings => higher consumption and/or more risk-taking
 - Creative destruction; reallocation of resources (labor & demand for goods); higher productivity
 - Away from the « zero lower bound » limit / good for monetary policy
 - Push for anti-trust policies

How I learnt to stop worrying about public debt and inflation

Martin Sandbu, Financial Times, Sept 22, 2022









Higher, and rather rapidly higher ... but from a definitely low starting point !



Source : Yardeni Research, Global Interest Rates https://www.yardeni.com/pub/glir.pdf



Rates – much higher or not?

YES as far as NOMINAL rates are concerned, definitely less so for REAL rates



	YEAR START	NOW	N	
(a) Nominal rate	0%	2,5%		YES, MUCH
(b) Inflation				HIGHER
- 2022	2%	9,4%		
- 2023	2%	6,5%		
– 2024 until 2031	2%	2,5%		
 Average over 10 years 	2%	3,6%	N	
(c) Real rate [=(a)-(b)]	-2%	-1,1%		NOT REALLY



Real interest rates are still low (US), or even negative (Germany)



 10-year US Treasury bond yield less yearly percent change in core CPI Source: Federal Reserve Board and Bureau of Economic Analysis.



Savings account, the surest way to lose some purchasing power

Nominal return :

Inflation :

Real return :

« Before » + 0,11% + 2,00% - 1,89%

2023 + 0,50% (???) + 6,50% (Bureau du Plan) - 6,00%





Budget économique



8 septembre 2022

Chiffres clés pour l'économie belge

Pourcentages de variation en volume sauf indication contraire

	2020	2021	2022	2023
Indice national des prix à la consommation	0,7	2,4	9,4	6,5
Indice santé	1,0	2,0	9,1	7,0



Interest rates : summit in sight ... pending the Russian roulette

- Inflation has peaked (base effect + no wage / price spiral) assuming no further war escalation
- Recession will be there to prevent zealous tightening
- Inflation rate expectations remain well anchored
- "Necessity knows no law" ("nécessité fait loi" / "nood breekt wet")
 - States : heavily indebted
 - + ageing
 - + social discontent
 - + financing of the transition (regulations & taxes are way too unpopular)
 - financial stability requirement (within the Euro Area; financial sector as creditor)
- + Higher rates not efficient to fight against supply-driven inflation (see next slide)





Higher rates, unfitted to fight against supply-driven inflation

- Higher rates against demand-driven inflation, YES
- ... but in Europe to a large extent inflation is supply-driven
 - Energy shortages
 - Labor supply shortages
 - Changes in consumption patterns / mismatches
 - Environmental transition
- \Rightarrow Tools to be considered
 - LOWER rates in order to boost capex (to ↗productivity, to finance transition capex, and to offset declining labor supply) ...
 - Active labor market policies
 - Competition rules, against « pricing power »
 - State regulation (price setting for some sectors, like energy, ...)



Interest rates : no "Volcker moment"

• No need

(anchoring of expectations, no wage spiral, ...)

• No possibility

in 1983, US economy salvaged by fiscal expansion ... today, public indebtedness is much higher







No paranoid belief : the central bank is my friend !

The Central Bank is my friend, not a dogmatic Moloch in a ivory tower requiring human sacrifices !

How the S&P 500 performs in Fed rate-hike cycles



Source: Truist Advisory Services









Conclusion

Conclusion

To sum up

- Uncertainty, yes but "as usual"
- A recession, most likely, but no deep recession on the agenda
- No wage/price spiral, and inflation to slow down (pending no further geopolitical escalation)
- Real interest rates to remain subdued



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